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ABSTRACT 
While it is known that acute and chronic stress can impact cognition, less is known about 
the immediate impacts of minor frustrations or positive experiences on subsequent behavior and 
cognition in primates. This study used a novel methodology to engineer both a positive and 
(slightly) frustrating experience, using the same apparatus, in 15 adult capuchin monkeys. 
Subjects were presented with a working memory task (DMTS) for 30 minutes after the 
experimental manipulations (or a control). As predicted, the frustrating task prior to testing 
resulted in a decrease in performance on the DMTS compared to performance after a positive 
experience or the control. Contrary to predictions, a positive experience did not facilitate 
performance to higher levels than the control condition. Manipulations also impacted several 
behaviors. Although there may be different results in different contexts, these results indicate 
that even mild negative experiences impact subsequent behavior and cognition in primates.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
An interest in describing and explaining emotions dates back to the early philosophers. 
Actual scientific research on emotions however, has had a more recent and staggered history. In 
psychology, the scientific study of emotions has had three major stages (Gendron & Barrett, 
2009). The first era, marked by prolific scientific study of emotions, is often attributed to 
Darwin’s publication of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). This lead 
to interesting debates in the scientific community over the manifestation of emotion (Cannon, 
1927; James, 1884). Following this initial period of excitement and interest, the age of 
behaviorism swept in and left little room for the study of emotion (Gendron & Barrett, 2009; 
Lazarus, 1998). In the 1960’s, with behaviorism’s decreasing authority in American psychology, 
a renewed interest in the study of emotions appeared (Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Lazarus, 1991).  
The history of the study of non-human animal (hereafter, animal) emotion follows a 
similar pattern. Darwin and James’ discussions of human emotions included comparisons to the 
emotional lives of animals, but again interest diminished with the rising power of behaviorism 
(de Waal, 2011). Despite the decrease in the authority of behaviorism giving rise to increased 
psychological research on human emotions, the study of animal emotions did not follow the 
same trend.  
There remains reluctance by some to attribute emotional states experienced by humans to 
any of our mammalian relatives (Bolhuis & Wynne, 2009). There are however many advocates 
in the scientific community for the position that animals do experience emotional lives akin to 
humans (de Waal, 2011; Panksepp, 2005). In the last few decades, there has been an increasing 
call for research on animal emotions from a functional and evolutionary standpoint to better 
understand human emotion (Lench, Darbor, & Berg, 2013; Trimmer, Paul, Mendl, McNamara, 
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& Houston, 2013; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013), as well as for potentially important applications in 
neuroscience, psychopharmacology (Mendl, Burman, & Paul, 2010), and animal welfare (Boissy 
et al., 2007; Dawkins, 2000; Désiré, Boissy, & Veissier, 2002). De Waal effectively sums up the 
conundrum behind our relative lack of studies on animal emotions, asserting that while animal 
emotion is deemed of little importance, it is rarely denied existence, leaving us with “the curious 
situation that a widely recognized aspect of animal behavior is deliberately ignored or 
minimized” (de Waal, 2011).  
Aside from leading to a failure to develop a broader understanding of animals, this may 
also hinder our ability to understand ourselves. Presumably, as with many other aspects of 
human psychology, basic human emotions have evolutionary roots exhibited in related taxa, 
particularly non-human primates (hereafter, primates), however little attention has been paid to 
this potentially highly illuminating connection, and comparative studies have been limited. 
Phylogenetic analyses could help determine whether there are similar interacting psychological 
processes in non-human mammalian brains, and further our understanding of the evolution and 
function of particular emotions in humans (Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013). 
One of the barriers researchers of animal emotion have run into is a definitional one. 
Despite the increased interest in the study of emotion seen in recent decades, syntheses of 
research across disciplines are few and far between. The fundamental question of how to define 
‘emotion’ lies at the heart of this issue. Emotions are something all humans are familiar with, but 
when asked, “what is an emotion?,” many struggle to produce an explicit definition. Even when 
asking those who are sure of their definition, responses will vary quite drastically. This issue has 
not been fully resolved, and often definitions differ between psychologists, philosophers, 
neuroscientists, sociologists, and anthropologists (Barrett, 2006a) . 
 3 
The matter of establishing definitional clarity across fields as to what constitutes an 
emotion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to define what I mean for 
the purposes of this study. The relevance of the debate for animal research lies in the factors 
included in some definitions of emotion, and their relation to studying emotions in animals. 
Oftentimes definitions will include a subjective experience component (Hockenbury & 
Hockenbury, 2010), which means that an emotional component necessitates consciousness. 
Whether or not non-human animals are conscious in the way we refer to human consciousness is 
an unresolved debate (Griffin & Speck, 2004; Mendl & Paul, 2004). Therefore, definitions of 
emotion that require consciousness pose a rather difficult hurdle for those who wish to study 
animal emotion. There are, however, many who define emotion without a subjective experience 
component (Boissy et al., 2007; de Waal, 2011), which is more tractable for empirical study. 
Additionally, regardless of whether scientists attribute ‘emotion’ in the human sense to animals’ 
experiences, it is generally agreed upon that at minimum, animals experience changes in affect 
(Dawkins, 2000; Panksepp, 2005, 2011; Paul, Harding, & Mendl, 2005a).  
It is then important to differentiate between the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’. For a time 
in psychology’s past, and still to some extent today, affect and emotion were used almost 
interchangeably (Daniel, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992). In modern psychology there has been an effort 
to distinguish between the terms, but as with the challenge of defining emotion, there is not 
universal agreement. In general, affect refers to the mental aspect of the internal bodily states 
associated with our representations of emotion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Spruijt, van den 
Bos, & Pijlman, 2001). Affect is the psychologically primitive state made up of an arousal level 
and hedonic valence (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Russell, 2003). Affect can be a component of 
emotion, but also exists in pure forms alone. A person is constantly experiencing affect, just the 
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nature and intensity of it are changing (Ekkekakis, 2013). Unlike emotions, affective states 
involve no judgment or assessment, and are not necessarily directed at anything (Russell, 2009). 
Affect has been a topic of psychological interest and research since the late 1800’s, dating back 
to Wundt and Titchner, who argued that affect is a fundamental “psychological ingredient” that 
cannot be further reduced, and that affect combined with other cognitive components is what 
creates an emotion (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Therefore, emotion is the fusion of core 
affective feeling with conceptual knowledge and experience, integrated mentally to categorize 
the emotion (Barrett, 2006b). 
For the purpose of the current study, I will typically use the term affect in reference to 
any potentially emotional experience in animals. With that being said, the relevant literature 
discussed will include studies referring to animal emotions, not just affect, and woven 
throughout the paper will be parallels drawn between research on animal ‘affect’ and human 
‘emotion’. Further, even animal research that generally refers to affect and not emotions often 
specifically utilizes emotional language such as ‘stress’, ‘frustration’ and ‘anxiety’ when 
referring to the affective experiences of their subjects (Gluck & Sackett, 1974; Maestripieri, 
Schino, Aureli, & Troisi, 1992; Troisi, 2002). The current study will also sometimes refer to a 
state of ‘frustration’ in the animal subjects, with the intention that this helps specify the type of 
affective state being experienced.  
1.1 The Emotion-Cognition Interaction 
Despite the fact that the emotion-cognition relationship has long been of interest to 
philosophers, in psychology, emotions and cognition have a history of being treated as separate 
entities and deemed of differential importance (Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Houwer & Hermans, 
2013). Since the 1980’s however, empirical research has started to address questions of the 
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interaction between emotions and cognitive processing, such as attention, memory, learning, 
judgments and decisions, and it is now well known that emotions/affect and cognition are 
complex, interrelated components of psychological processing (Houwer & Hermans, 2013). 
Much of the research has focused on how emotional stimuli are treated different cognitively than 
neutral stimuli. Numerous studies have demonstrated that emotionally significant stimuli 
selectively receive more attention than non-emotional stimuli (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; 
Compton, 2003; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Further, emotional stimuli are better 
remembered than neutral stimuli (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 
1999).  
While some impacts of emotions are general and not emotion or even valence specific, 
such as the general enhancement of memory for positive or negative emotional stimuli (Hamann 
et al., 1999), other cognition-emotion interactions are more specific. Of particular interest to the 
current study, the impacts of emotion on working memory are asymmetric, such that positive 
emotions can have facilitating effects on some tasks and detrimental effects on others, while the 
opposite is true for negative emotions (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-Schefft, 
1999). These results have been traced to differences in brain activation patterns when 
experiencing emotion.  
Neurological research has demonstrated a different lateralization of activation in the 
frontal lobe when experiencing positive and negative emotions, such that positive emotions 
result in relatively higher levels of left frontal lobe activation, while negative emotions are 
associated with right frontal lobe activity (Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, 
Senulis, & Friesen, 1990). The interpretations one draws from these findings, however, have not 
been quite as straightforward. Some claim that brain activation in the area required by a task 
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facilitates performance on that task, such that positive emotions (increasing left hemisphere 
activation) enhance performance on tasks reliant on left prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation, while 
negative emotions (increasing right hemisphere activation) facilitate performance on right PFC 
tasks (Gray, 2001; Heller & Nitscke, 1997). This stems from the idea that activation reflects a 
readiness to engage in certain tasks, such as those that require similar brain activation (Bartolic et 
al., 1999). Alternatively, dual processing models theorize that when two tasks or processes are 
utilizing the same brain region, performance on the task may be impaired if there is a depletion 
of cognitive resources or cross-talk interference (Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1978; Shackman et al., 
2006).  
Working memory poses a particularly good area of study in this regard, because different 
types of working memory, while all fairly reliant on PFC activity, differ in brain activation 
within different regions of the PFC. Numerous studies have demonstrated that verbal working 
memory is left lateralized while spatial working memory is right lateralized (d’Esposito et al., 
1998; Davidson et al., 1990). Other studies have similarly found right lateralization for spatial 
working memory and compared it to object working memory tasks that are relatively left 
lateralized (Courtney, Petit, Haxby, & Ungerleider, 1998; d’Esposito et al., 1998; Smith et al., 
1995). These findings inspired a series of studies looking at the asymmetric effects of emotion on 
cognition between different working memory tasks during positive or negative emotional states.  
Bartolic and colleagues’ (1999) study was one of the first to systematically induce 
positive and negative affect in participants and examine the effects on two tasks associated with 
different frontal lobe activation. Either positive or negative affect was induced in participants 
using the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP) in which subjects listened to, and then read 
silently and aloud, self-referent statements about their mood. Participants were then tested on 
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either the Controlled Oral Word Association Task (associated with increased relative activation 
of the left frontal lobe), or the Ruff Figural Fluency Test (associated with increased activation of 
the right frontal lobe), to look at the effects of emotion on verbal and figural fluency, 
respectively. The results of the experiment were consistent with their predictions that 
emotionally induced brain activation would result in a ‘readiness’ that would facilitate 
subsequent tasks asymmetrically reliant on that brain region. Positive affect (left activating) 
enhanced verbal fluency (left activating) above figural fluency (right activating), while negative 
affect (right activating) coincided with the opposite effects. 
In another pioneering study, Gray (2001) designed an experiment to contrast the effects of 
emotion on spatial and verbal working memory. An important distinction between Gray’s study 
and those that preceded it was their ability to control for motivation and task difficulty by using a 
two-back task for both verbal and spatial working memory assessment. In the study, subjects had 
positive, negative (referred to in the paper as approach and withdrawal, respectively), and neutral 
emotional states induced by watching videos. Subjects were then tested on either a verbal or a 
spatial two-back task. In both tasks, a letter (a-f) appeared somewhere on the screen and subjects 
had to indicate whether it was the same or different than the item two items ago. For the verbal 
task subjects were told to ignore location and indicate whether the letter was the same or not, and 
for the spatial task they were told to ignore the letter and indicate whether it was in the same 
location on the screen or not. Overall, Gray found that positive emotional states increased 
performance on the verbal task while impairing performance on the spatial task, while the 
opposite was true of negative emotional states, increasing spatial performance while hindering 
verbal. The results also indicated that the effects were significantly stronger for those individuals 
who did the most poorly on the tasks (Gray, 2001). The importance of these studies was in 
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demonstrating that emotional valence, and not just emotional arousal generally, had selective 
effects on cognitive functioning and may be a result of interacting brain activation patterns. 
Additionally, both of these studies supported the model predicting that prior activation of a brain 
region similarly activated in a subsequent task facilitated performance on that task. 
Unfortunately the clear picture these studies painted has since been clouded. Lavric and 
colleagues (2003) and Shackman and colleagues (2006) both empirically tested the asymmetric 
effects of emotions on verbal and spatial working memory, and found the opposite effects of the 
previously discussed studies. Both of these later studies hypothesized that the cognitive demands 
of threat-evoked anxiety would deplete resources in the right PFC and impair spatial working 
memory (dependent on the right PFC) but not verbal working memory (dependent on the left 
PFC), and both of the studies found support for their hypotheses. They additionally both cited 
that a flaw of the previous studies (Bartolic et al., 1999 & Gray, 2001) was their lack of an 
objective measure of affect, like the inclusion of heart-rate measures or startle responses, as well 
as self-report. Shackman suggests that perhaps modest levels of anxiety do in fact produce an 
enhancing effect to right PFC tasks, however higher anxiety levels represent an increase in 
resource depletion that may lead to the deleterious effects found in these later studies.  
This difference in the level of affect may explain both sets of data. If both Gray (2001) and 
Bartolic and colleagues’ (1999) manipulations induced only mild negative affect, while the threat 
of a shock used in Lavric and colleagues’ (2003) and Shackman and colleagues’ (2006) studies 
induced much higher levels of anxiety, then this could explain the disparate results. Indeed, 
Shackman and colleagues note that in Gray’s (2001) study, the level of anxiety reported by 
participants was half that reported by the later two studies. Regardless of a consensus on how 
brain activation is mediating asymmetric effects of emotion on cognition, which remains 
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important, the research is clear that there is in fact an interaction between different valence 
emotions and subsequent working memory performance.   
1.2 Research on Affect in Animals 
Affective research with non-human animals had a later start than research with humans, 
and has also taken a different trajectory. While human research is also subject to a bias towards 
negative emotion, this is the predominant focus in animals (Moberg, 2013; Paul, Harding, & 
Mendl, 2005b; Rosen & Donley, 2006). Early emotional research with animals primarily 
stemmed from an interest in using animals as models of human emotion, and often exploited the 
less rigid ethical standards required for research with non-human animals compared to that with 
humans. This led to animals being used as models of pain exposure (Maier, Drugan, & Grau, 
1982), drug use (Bodnoff, Suranyi-Cadotte, Quirion, & Meaney, 1989), early maternal 
separation (Higley, Hasert, Suomi, & Linnoila, 1991), and social isolation (Matsumoto, Pinna, 
Puia, Guidotti, & Costa, 2005), as well as the general effects of acute and chronic stress on 
cognition and behavior (Cazakoff, Johnson, & Howland, 2010; Moreira, Almeida, Leite-
Almeida, Sousa, & Costa, 2016). Brain lesion research, used to look at the involvement of 
particular brain regions on emotional processing, was also only possible in animals (Bliss-
Moreau, Bauman, & Amaral, 2011; Kalin & Sheltona, 2003). 
While animal models of human emotional processing have been influential, the gap in 
knowledge on the behavioral, cognitive, and physiological responses to positive affect in non-
human species is striking. Additionally, by focusing studies of animal affect on scenarios of such 
intensity that we cannot test human participants, or modeling animal research on clinical 
populations, we are neglecting the acquisition of knowledge on the key types of affective 
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processing that we know much about in humans, specifically how normal fluctuations in positive 
and negative affect impact animal behavior and cognition in their day to day lives. 
Recently though, and in line with the current study, researchers have begun to study 
animal affect in a way more comparable to what is seen in the literature on human affect and to 
discover the parallels and differences in the psychological processing of animal emotions. The 
most immediate challenge with this, however, is measurement, because of the difficulty in 
ascertaining what affective state is being experienced and when. The disproportionate 
representation of research on negative affect in animals continues in this area, at least in part due 
to the relative ease of observing and measuring negative affect as compared to positive affect 
(Boissy et al., 2007).  
In humans, the most common measure of emotion is self-report. While self-report is 
obviously not possible when studying a non-human animal species, instead of being a 
shortcoming, it can be an opportunity to develop reliable objective measures of affect so that we 
can determine what an organism is feeling instead of what they say they are feeling. Indeed, in 
humans, self-report measures of emotions are not always reliable, particularly when reflecting on 
past emotional states as opposed to current states (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Mauss and 
Robinson (2009) purport that experiential, physiological and behavioral measures of emotion 
should not be treated interchangeably, but used in concert with one another for the most 
comprehensive understanding of emotional experiences. 
As experiential measures are impossible with animals, physiological and behavioral 
measures have been the most utilized methodologies in determining affect in animals. Some 
commonly used physiological measures of animal affect are heart rate, skin conductance and 
temperature, blood pressure, and measures of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) function 
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(Aureli, Preston, & de Waal, 1999; Blanchard et al., 1998; Elder & Menzel, 2001; Paul et al., 
2005b; Süer, Dolu, Özesmi, Şahin, & Ülgen, 1998). These are not, however, the most ideal 
measures of affect alone, as many of them are invasive and require stress-inducing restraint of 
the animal, or have low temporal accuracy. Sampling methods that themselves cause stress and 
anxiety in the subjects cannot be used, and even those that do not do so, such as implanted heart 
monitors, may require an invasive surgery and/or expensive equipment to set up. Additionally, 
these physiological measures have a tendency to measure negative affect more reliably than 
positive affect, and they do not provide a high level of specificity for the affect being 
experienced, typically providing more information on arousal than valence. In general, these 
measures work best in conjunction with other measures, or to provide a very general measure of 
affective change.  
As a result, researchers have turned to behavioral measures, which avoid many of these 
problems. Behavioral measures used to look at affect in animals include vocal expressions (rats; 
Knutson, Burgdorf, & Panksepp, 2002; baboons; Rendall, 2003; cattle; Watts & Stookey, 2000) 
approach/withdrawal behavior (rhesus macaques; Humphrey & Keeble, 1974; rats; Montgomery 
& Monkman, 1955) and spontaneous behaviors such as play (Fraser & Duncan, 1998; Paul et al., 
2005b). Animals’ startle responses have been a less widely used measure of affective state, but 
have promise as a simple indicator of affective valence, with negative affect increasing startle 
responses and positive affect attenuating them (Cook, Davis, Hawk, Spence, & Gautier, 1992; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000). Additionally, overt behaviors 
of organisms can often be used to measure affective state, and may be both the most easily 
recorded and reliable behavioral measure. In primates as well as other species, displacement 
behaviors such as scratching and other self-directed behaviors have been widely used as an 
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indicator of negative affect (Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002), and stereotypic, repetitive 
behaviors have also been implicated as a sign of psychological distress (Garner, 2005; Garner, 
Meehan, & Mench, 2003; Novak, Bailoo, Melotti, Rommen, & Würbel, 2015; Pomerantz, 
Terkel, Suomi, & Paukner, 2012). Unfortunately, none of these behaviors are able to measure 
both negative and positive affect.  
Recently, cognitive outputs, such as attention, memory, and judgment biases, have been 
proposed as a potential measure of affective states in animals (Paul et al., 2005). The idea behind 
this is that if different affective states are demonstrated to have predictable changes in cognitive 
outputs, then if you observe these changes in cognitive output, you may be able to trace the 
change back to the affective state being experienced. Attention biases in humans demonstrate 
that people experiencing negative affective states, particularly anxiety, bias their attention toward 
threatening stimuli more than when experiencing positive affect (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Bradley et al., 1997). Similarly, memory bias 
studies with both humans and non-human animals have demonstrated that emotional states can 
impact memory retention and retrieval, such that negative affect can improve memory. This 
latter effect appears somewhat non-specific and more work has to be done before memory biases 
can be used as an effective tool for affect measurement in animals (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). 
Judgment biases, such as interpretations of ambiguity, while arguably the most complex 
of the three cognitive biases mentioned, may also be the most promising area for animal affect 
research (Paul et al., 2005) and have already been utilized across a range of species (rats: 
Anderson, Munafò, & Robinson, 2012; Brydges, Leach, Nicol, Wright, & Bateson, 2011; 
Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004; pigs: Douglas, Bateson, Walsh, Bédué, & Edwards, 2012; dogs: 
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Michael Mendl, Brooks, et al., 2010; sheep: Doyle et al., 2010; rhesus macaques: Bethell et al., 
2012; capuchin monkeys: Pomerantz et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). Generally speaking, 
judgment biases manifest with positive affect resulting in ‘optimistic’ interpretations of 
ambiguity, and negative affect resulting in ‘pessimistic’ interpretations. Research with humans 
demonstrates that subjects in positive moods assign higher probabilities to positive future 
outcomes than negative future outcomes, while the opposite is true for subjects experiencing 
negative affect (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996; Wright & 
Bower, 1992).  
The initial methodology put forth by Harding, Paul, and Mendl (2004) utilized a go/no-go 
paradigm where rats were trained to press a lever after hearing a specific tone to receive a food 
reward, and refrain from pressing the lever after hearing a different tone in order to avoid a 
negative event. After this training, subjects were divided into two groups living in either 
‘predictable housing’ or ‘unpredictable housing’. Unpredictable housing had been previously 
established as stress inducing for the rats. All subjects were then presented with an ambiguous 
tone, intermediate between the tones associated with positive and negative outcomes, and 
subsequent behavior was measured. Rats in the unpredictable housing condition were slower to 
respond, and significantly less likely to press the lever than were rats in the predictable housing 
condition, demonstrating that they tended to interpret the ambiguous stimuli as negative 
(expecting a shock) more often than the rats who lived in less stressful housing environments. 
Variations of this technique have been used, and regardless of methodology, these studies are 
finding significant judgment biases in the animal species tested, such that negative affective 
states correlate with a negative interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, while positive affective 
states correlate with a positive interpretation of ambiguity.  
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The issue with translating this measure to primates is that the original methodology put 
forth utilized positive and negative outcomes for the different stimuli. This poses an ethical 
dilemma for many species, since shocks or changes in housing are not always ethical or 
appropriate. To account for this, researchers have adapted the paradigm so that the only 
‘negative’ outcome that subjects experience is a lack of reward (Bethell et al., 2012; Pomerantz 
et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). While this may solve the ethical dilemma, lack of reward is not 
especially salient as a negative outcome, particularly for subjects that are used to experimental 
tests in which they are unrewarded on some trials (i.e., following incorrect responses).  
Despite this potential issue, recent studies with capuchins have successfully utilized the 
judgment bias measure to look at how normal positive social interactions such as grooming, as 
well as more long-term states such as rank or the expression of stereotypic behaviors, may be 
impacting affect (Pomerantz et al., 2012; Schino et al., 2016). In both of these studies, subjects 
interpreted an ambiguous length stimulus after learning that certain longer or shorter length 
stimuli corresponded to different value foods in specific locations. Subjects who looked in the 
location of the higher value reward in response to the ambiguous stimulus were deemed to be 
making an ‘optimistic’ judgment, while selection of the lower value reward location was marked 
a ‘pessimistic’ judgment.  
The first study found that subjects who exhibited high levels of stereotypic behavior 
demonstrated negative judgment biases compared to monkeys who performed less stereotypic 
behavior, but the effect was only significant for stereotypic head-twirling and not pacing 
behavior (Pomerantz et al., 2012). The other study found that rank and high overall levels of 
received grooming correlated with positive judgments in the task, but there were no immediate 
effects of recently received grooming on the judgment bias (Schino et al., 2016). These results 
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indicate that judgment biases may be most useful when looking at more long-term states than 
short-term, within-individual changes in affect, although it also could indicate that grooming 
does not impact subsequent affect.  
While the purpose of these studies was to demonstrate that certain behaviors impacted the 
affective states of the monkeys, using judgment biases as merely a measure of affect, they also 
demonstrate that affective states affect cognition. While this was not a driving intention behind 
the studies themselves, the entire concept of this measurement relies upon the fact that different 
affective states are impacting cognition in specific ways. As the judgment bias is found in 
multiple species of animals as well as humans, this provides evidence that animal cognition is 
impacted by emotional processing in similar ways to humans (Brydges et al., 2011; Matheson, 
Asher, & Bateson, 2008; Michael Mendl, Burman, Parker, & Paul, 2009; Rygula, Pluta, & 
Popik, 2012). 
Finally, research has now further demonstrated that animals, and specifically non-human 
primates, have similar psychological processing systems for emotions and affect as that of 
humans. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) experience physiological arousal in response to 
emotionally charged videos, and are able to match conspecific emotional facial expressions to 
the valence of a video scene (Parr, 2001). Animals also apparently process emotional stimuli 
similarly to humans. Chimpanzees experience delayed reaction times in response to negative 
images in comparison to neutral stimuli in an emotional Stroop task, akin to the responses of 
humans (Allritz, Call, & Borkenau, 2015). Additionally, Blanchette et al. (2016) recently 
demonstrated that baboons (Papio papio) respond less accurately and with a greater response 
time to negative stimuli in comparison to neutral. This study was one of the first to demonstrate 
that the negative stimuli did not need to be visually present for the effect to occur, but still 
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manifests when the stimulus is only mentally represented. These studies further demonstrate that 
the organization of emotional processing within primate brains may be similar to that in humans.  
As in the human literature, animal researchers are interested in not just how task-related 
emotional stimuli can interfere with cognitive processing and attention, but how task-irrelevant 
affective states may be affecting behavior and cognition, and vice versa. We know that behavior 
can impact the affective states of animals (i.e., judgment biases), but how do those affective 
states impact subsequent behavior and cognition? This is the focus of my current work. 
Additionally, I will try to address a remaining issue facing animal researchers, the fact that the 
classification of positive affect remains elusive. While ‘optimistic’ judgment biases may allow 
for the identification of positive affect, there is uncertainly as to whether this bias would be 
effective in measuring small, short-term changes in affect. Specifically, my goal is to identify an 
observable behavioral indicator of positive affect. 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of the current study was to explore the inter-relationship between 
affect and cognition in a primate model. I wanted to make the research as comparable as possible 
to the human literature, so that I could consider the similarities between human and non-human 
animal psychological processing. With comparative research, however, it can be difficult to draw 
any definitive conclusions when procedures being compared are vastly different (Brosnan, 
Beran, Parrish, Price, & Wilson, 2013). Due to the prevalence of language-based inductions and 
measures in human emotion research, it is often impossible to use the exact same methodology 
with animals, and therefore keeping at least the nature of the experiments as similar as possible is 
vital. Previous research on animal affect has primarily focused on the effects of intense negative 
affect as the result of extreme stimuli (such as shocks), and while this is informative, in most 
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human studies the affect inducer is relatively mild (and arguably more similar to naturally 
occurring context). Relatively little research has focused on animal affect as it plays out in a 
healthy organism’s typical life (with a few notable exceptions described above), and past 
research has rarely generated affective states akin to those created within contexts in the 
subjects’ natural lives.  
I therefore attempted to present the capuchins with a manipulation reflecting their natural 
behavior, which I expected to induce both positive and negative affect in different contexts. 
Capuchin monkeys are extractive foragers (Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004), meaning 
they routinely extricate food from difficult to obtain sources, such as inside hard-shelled nuts. 
This study’s affect manipulation took advantage of this, artificially creating a negative 
experience where food was unobtainable from a previously reliable source, and generated a 
positive experience using the same task but allowing it to result in consistent high value reward 
acquisition.  
Affect manipulation was immediately followed by a delayed match-to-sample task, to 
measure working memory performance in the monkeys. In line with the human literature on the 
effects of emotions and affective states on working memory, as well as some primate studies, I 
hypothesized there would be a decrease in cognitive performance after a negative experience and 
an enhancing effect of a positive experience (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Oei, Everaerd, 
Elzinga, van Well, & Bermond, 2006; Schoofs, Preuss, & Wolf, 2008).  
A second goal of the current study was to inform the sparse literature on the effects of 
positive affect in animals. My primary focus was to find behavioral indicators of positive affect, 
of which there are none in the current literature. In this study, I collected data on all behaviors 
exhibited by the subjects, not just behaviors known to be important in animal affective 
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experience drawn from the literature, in the hopes of discovering a behavioral marker of positive 
affect. I did not have any direct predictions for what behaviors might increase after a positive 
experience, which presumably led to positive affect, and thus hoped to find behavioral measures 
that correlated with the condition. Consistent with the literature, I predicted that rates of 
displacement behaviors, such as scratching, self-touching and urine washing, as well as 
stereotypic behaviors, would increase after subjects had a negative experience that presumably 
led to negative affect (Garner, 2005; Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002).  
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2 METHODS 
2.1 Subjects 
Subjects used in the current study were 15 adult (7 male) tufted capuchin monkeys 
(Cebus apella), housed at Georgia State University’s Language Research Center. Subjects were 
all socially housed in three separate multi-male, multi-female social groups composed of five, six 
and 10 individuals (Group 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Due to a husbandry issue, Group 2, with six 
monkeys, was separated into a group of four and a group of two prior to the beginning of data 
collection. The two males separated from their group were brothers, and remained within close 
proximity and constant visual and vocal contact with their original group. Subjects’ housing 
enclosures included both indoor and outdoor areas with enrichment toys and climbing structures 
for natural movement and activity. Subjects received primate chow, as well as fruits and 
vegetables, daily, and additionally got supplemental enrichment foods most days. All subject 
participation in this study was completely voluntary, with no food deprivation, and water 
available ad libitum, including during testing.  
Subjects expressed their willingness to participate by voluntarily separating into 
individual test boxes connected along the outside caging of their home enclosure on the morning 
of testing days. Subjects received either one peanut (Groups 1 and 2) or one pecan (Group 3) 
upon entering the individual test box. Out of the 21 monkeys housed at the Language Research 
Center, only 15 were used in the current study. Three of the monkeys were excluded because 
they do not readily separate into the individual test boxes. Another monkey was excluded from 
the study due to her impaired visual and motor abilities as a result of old age, and two monkeys 
failed to pass the training criterion for the delayed match-to-sample procedure (details below).  
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2.2 General Procedure 
The current study investigated how different types of experiences (positive or negative) 
affect primate working memory, as measured by performance on a cognitive task. In order to 
explore this, we first needed to generate experiences that would be interpreted as either positive 
or negative by the subjects. In an attempt to keep methodology as similar as possible across 
conditions, and thus reduce the possibility of alternative explanations for my results, I used the 
same puzzle task for both the positive and negative experiences, adapted to be either rewarding 
or frustrating (see below). The apparatus used, shown in Figure 1, was an opaque tube that 
attached diagonally to the outside of the subjects’ individual test boxes, hung at an angle that 
allowed food rewards placed in the top to roll down it. Three levers or slides, painted blue, were 
placed perpendicularly at equal lengths down the tube such that, when closed, they would stop 
the progression of rolling food. At the beginning of a trial, all three levers (located next to the 
arrows in Figure 1a) were closed. A small piece of colorful cereal (Cap’n Crunch OOPS! All 
Berries Cereal) was placed into the top of the tube, stopping when it hit the first lever. Subjects 
then had 30 seconds to retrieve the food reward, by lifting all three levers in successive order to 
drop the reward down the tube and into the retrieval tray (Figure 1b). If the subject was not 
successful within the 30 seconds, the trial timed out and there was a 15-second time out before 
the next trial began (this never occurred during testing sessions). If a trial was successful, 
subjects experienced a 10-second inter-trial interval (ITI) before the next trial began. Different 
manipulations were used to induce positive and negative affect (described below). 
Subjects experienced the different conditions’ manipulations immediately prior to 30 
minutes on a computerized test of cognitive performance (a delayed match-to-sample task). 
While the human literature indicates that the temporal retention of some types of experimentally 
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manipulated affect may be less than 30 minutes (Frost & Green, 1982; Gomez, Zimmermann, 
Guttormsen Schär, & Danuser, 2009), other research, specifically those relating to anxiety, 
indicate that the duration of an anxious mood may last much longer (Kuhlmann, Piel, & Wolf, 
2005; Schoofs et al., 2008). The 30-minute testing session was therefore selected to simply 
ensure any record of potentially long lasting effects of the experimental manipulation was 
caught, as well as maintain consistency with typical testing procedures at the facility. Digital 
time stamps for each trial were recorded, which allowed us to go back and look at accuracy for 
shorter durations than the full 30-minute session. In particular, we analyzed the session in three 
10-minute sections.  
Each subject experienced 18 sessions, divided among six positive experience sessions, 
six negative experience sessions, and six control sessions (in which there was no manipulation), 
and subjects always immediately began the cognitive task after completing the affect 
manipulation (except in the control). All six sessions of each condition were presented to the 
subjects consecutively, with the order of condition presentation pseudo-randomized so that half 
the subjects (n=8) experienced the negative experience first, while the other half (n=7) 
experienced the positive experience first. All subjects were presented with the six control 
sessions in between the positive and negative sessions. All 18 sessions and the subsequent 
computerized testing were video recorded for behavioral analysis.  
 22 
 
Figure 1. Puzzle apparatus used for manipulations. Arrows in (a) indicate the direction the three 
levers lifted in order for the food reward to pass down the tube, traveling from the top right in the 
picture to the bottom left, where the reward would fall into the retrieval tray (b) and be collected 
(see text for detail). (c) depicts how the tray opened in the "trap-door” sessions. 
 
2.3 Positive/Negative Experience Manipulation 
2.3.1 Training 
Subjects were presented with the puzzle apparatus for training/familiarization sessions 
before testing. Each session consisted of 10 trials. Trials began when the tube was baited with the 
food reward, and the subjects had one minute to retrieve it. If the subject was unable to complete 
the trial within the allotted time, the experimenter lifted each lever herself, allowing the subject 
to watch the reward fall into the retrieval tray. Subjects were then allowed access to the reward, 
and incurred a 15 second time out before the next trial. Subjects passed the training phase when 
they successfully retrieved the reward (without the experimenter’s assistance) on at least eight 
out of 10 trials on two consecutive sessions. All subjects successfully passed training within 
three sessions.  
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2.3.2 Positive Experience  
To create an experience that I anticipated being pleasurable for the monkeys, subjects 
were presented with the familiar puzzle apparatus. Subjects completed six consecutive trials with 
positive reinforcement in the form of a food reward. Consistently receiving a desired food 
reward with minimal effort was assumed to be a positive experience. It has also been 
demonstrated that object manipulation tasks are mentally enriching to primates (Celli, 
Tomonaga, Udono, Teramoto, & Nagano, 2003), so this was predicted to further influence the 
positivity of the experience.  
2.3.3 Negative Experience 
To generate a negative experience, the subjects were presented with the same puzzle task, 
but successful completion of the task (and subsequent access to the food reward) was impossible 
on some trials. Subjects completed 10 consecutive trials during each negative experience session. 
During four of those trials however, the food reward was unobtainable, a presumably frustrating 
experience for the subjects. As subjects were unable to acquire the reward in 4/10 trials, the 
negative sessions resulted in a total of six actual food rewards, the same as in the positive 
condition, to control for satiation. The impossible trials occurred in a pseudo-randomized order 
within the 10-trial sessions, with no more than two impossible trials in a row. 
There were two different types of impossible trials: jammed-lever trials and trap-door 
trials. During jammed-lever trials, the apparatus was experimentally manipulated by turning a 
screw (see Figure 1) so that the third and final lever was prevented from lifting high enough to 
allow the food reward to pass underneath. Trials lasted 30 seconds, after which the lever was un-
jammed and the food reward was removed by the experimenter, which was followed by a 10 
second ITI before the next trial. In trap-door trials, a latch in the bottom of the retrieval tray was 
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unhooked, so that after successful lifting of the third lever, the food reward would fall through 
the retrieval tray to the floor, where it was unreachable (Figure 1c). During both types of 
negative affect sessions, before every trial the experimenter would manipulate the screw 
(jammed-lever) or the retrieval tray latch (trap-door) so that subjects were not cued to when an 
impossible trial was set to occur. I cannot be certain the subjects were completely unaware of 
which trials were the “bad” ones, however the fact that in every case all subjects attempted to 
solve each trial (impossible or not) indicates they likely were naïve to the condition. The two 
different types of negative experience (trap-door and jammed-lever) were included to ensure the 
generation of a negative experience in case one method may have been more effective than 
another, but there were no prior predictions on which would be more successful. Subsequent 
analysis revealed no differences between the two types of negative experiences on performance, 
so all further analyses grouped the two manipulations into a single negative experience 
condition.  
2.4 Cognitive Task (Delayed Match-to-Sample) 
The current study used a delayed match-to-sample (DMTS) task to assess working 
memory in the capuchin monkeys. The DMTS was presented to the subjects using the Language 
Research Center’s (LRC) Computerized Test System. The computerized testing occurred in the 
subject’s same individual test box as the experience manipulations occurred, immediately 
following the manipulation (except in the control condition, in which subjects began 
immediately after they separated into the individual box). Each subject had a personal computer 
with a 17-inch monitor, a joystick that moves a cursor on the screen, and a pellet dispenser that 
distributed small 45-mg banana flavored pellets to the subjects as rewards for a correct response. 
Personal computers were stationed approximately 30 cm in front of a Plexiglas window on the 
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individual test box, with their personal joystick placed in the box with them. Subjects at the LRC 
have had years of experience testing, and are therefore extremely familiar with the computerized 
system. They also had extensive prior experience with the DMTS task (Beran et al., 2008; Beran, 
Evans, Klein, & Einstein, 2012; Beran & Smith, 2011; Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 
2008). 
Subjects were tested on a DMTS for 30 minutes, during which they could do as many or 
as few trials as they chose. At the onset of a trial, an image would appear centered near the top of 
the subject’s screen, along with their cursor in the center. Subjects could move their cursor up 
towards the image, and upon contact with the border of the image, the picture would disappear. 
This would then be followed by a delay of 1, 2, 3 or 5 seconds (randomized order for five trials 
of each time delay presented within 20 trial blocks). After the delay, the target image and another 
picture would simultaneously appear, randomized between the right and left sides of the screen 
(Figure 2). If the subject moved the cursor to the image that matched the original sample, they 
would hear a familiar chime indicating a correct response and receive a small banana flavored 
pellet. This would be followed by a 2-second ITI before the next trial would begin. If the 
subjects moved their cursor over the incorrect image, they would hear a buzzer indicating an 
incorrect response and receive no reward and a 5-second timeout before the next trial. Regardless 
of accuracy, after every 20 trials there was a 1-minute time out to force brief periods throughout 
the task where behavior could be observed that was not specifically directed at the task. 
My delay periods (1, 2, 3 and 5 seconds) were chosen based on a previous study with 
capuchin monkeys that indicated that 3-second delays affect both subject response time and 
accuracy as compared to shorter time delays (Truppa, De Simone, Piano Mortari, & De Lillo, 
2014). The 5-second delay was also included to see if there were any effects of the experiences 
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on a more challenging task, without increasing the duration so much so that performance sharply 
decreased (as is evidenced after 8-second delays; Tavares & Tomaz, 2002). Results indicated 
that performance on 1 and 2-second delay trials did not differ from one another, but performance 
was impaired by 3-second delays, and further compromised by 5-second delays. There was not 
an interaction between delay and condition on their impact on performance, so for all subsequent 
analyses data from all delays were combined to provide maximum power to the overall analysis.  
 
Figure 2. Example of the DMTS task screen with sample stimuli. Examples of the original novel stimuli 
used (a), familiar stimuli used in training (b), and the novel stimuli used for testing (c). 
 
b. Familiar Stimuli 
c. Novel Probe/Testing 
Stimuli
a. Original Novel 
Stimuli
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Subjects were not originally expected to require training, as all the monkeys had passed a 
computer training battery program that included a DMTS before the onset of the study. However, 
for some subjects, it had been some time since they had experienced a DMTS, so to verify that 
they all still met criterion, subjects were presented with the DMTS using novel stimuli. An 
analysis of the data from the subjects’ first three sessions revealed that the subjects were 
performing below 80% accuracy (the criterion set for performance), so testing was immediately 
stopped and the subjects were placed on training.  
2.4.1 Training 
Training used the same computerized testing setup described above. The task was the 
exact same as described, with the four different time delays in 20 trial blocks, followed by a 1-
minute timeout. The only difference in the task between training and the original testing attempt 
was the stimuli. In the original testing sessions, I introduced novel stimuli that were fairly 
complex, and may have been too difficult for the subjects to differentiate (Figure 2a). During 
training I used familiar clip-art stimuli that the subjects had seen before during their computer 
training (Figure 2b). Subjects also experienced 1-hour training sessions (no more than once 
daily) instead of 30-minute testing sessions. Subjects reached training criterion once they 
demonstrated 80% or better accuracy during two consecutive sessions. They were then placed on 
1-2 Probe sessions, where subjects again experienced a 1-hour session, however the task used 
novel stimuli. Instead of the complicated novel stimuli used in the original testing, for Probe 
trials I used a bank of 238 images from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (BOSS), a large 
normative photo database (Brodeur, Guérard, & Bouras, 2014). If subjects successfully 
maintained 80% or higher accuracy on the first or second Probe session (all subjects did), then 
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they passed to the testing phase. Overall, it took the subjects an average of 11 sessions to reach 
the training criterion.  
2.4.2 Testing 
Testing followed the exact same procedure as training, but I used a bank of 450 different 
BOSS photos than were used during the Probe sessions.  
2.5 Behavioral Analysis  
Each session was video-recorded. Behavior was coded for the entire 30 minutes during 
which the subjects were on the DMTS task. All anticipated behaviors were compiled into an 
ethogram, and any novel behaviors observed during coding were added to the ethogram. No new 
behaviors were observed after one session of each subject was coded. The final ethogram 
included a total of 22 behaviors (see Appendix A). All behavior was recorded because, while 
there are some behaviors known to be associated with stress/anxiety, there are currently no 
behaviors in the literature that are behavioral indicators of a positive affective state, and so I was 
unable to make predictions about which behaviors would be relevant. Therefore, the purpose of 
this component was to identify relevant behavior(s) for use in future work. 
Of the 22 behaviors recorded, I eliminated four that were observed in fewer than 10 of 
the subjects. One behavior, water drinking, was also eliminated because it was deemed irrelevant 
to the manipulation, as thirst is a state behavior unlikely to be affected by experiential changes. 
Joystick touching was eliminated because it was presumably correlated with trial number, and 
was additionally difficult to reliably code. Likewise, vocalizations could not be reliably coded or 
differentiated without specialized recording equipment. Finally, in two cases several behaviors 
were combined because there were strong theoretical grounds to do so (this also increased 
power). ‘Licking the cage’, ‘picking at the cage’, and ‘wiping the cage’ were all grouped 
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together into ‘cage-directed behaviors’. ‘Pacing’, ‘head-twirling’, and ‘rub hands’ behaviors 
were grouped together into a ‘stereotypic behavior’ category, as these are all stereotypical, 
functionless and repetitive behaviors often manifest in captive primate populations (Garner, 
2005; Garner et al., 2003; Pomerantz et al., 2012). The stereotypic behaviors alone would have 
each been eliminated from analysis based on the criterion that at least 10 subjects display the 
behavior, but as a category this involved 10 or more individuals. Therefore, for the ultimate 
analysis I looked at nine individual behaviors and two behavioral categories.  
2.6 Data Analysis 
All statistical analyses were run in R version 3.23 (R Core Team, 2015). Model analyses 
were conducted using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). All model 
comparisons were compared using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the best-
fit models. P-values were determined via likelihood ratio tests comparing the full model with the 
fixed effects against a null model with just the random effects. Behaviors were measured as 
counts of every occurrence of the behavior (or behavioral category) of interest within a session. 
Sessions were divided up by time into three sections; 0-10 minutes, 10-20 minutes and 20-30 
minutes to examine any possible effects of time within a session. Accuracy was measured as the 
proportion of correct responses to the total number of trials completed. Visual inspection of 
residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality.  
First, to initially determine if condition influenced overall levels of participation in the 
DMTS task, I ran a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with trial number as the 
dependent variable (DV). I included condition (control, positive and negative) and time as fixed 
effects, and Subject ID as a random effect. I compared the full model to the null model (which 
included only the random effect) using a likelihood ratio test.  
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Second, to assess whether behaviors differed across the conditions, I ran a series of 
GLMMs with Poisson distributions for each behavior. I constructed separate models with counts 
of each behavior (or behavioral category) as the DVs, condition as a fixed effect, and Subject ID 
entered as a random effect. Analysis excluded 3 cases with missing data. 
Third, I examined the effects of both condition and behavior on accuracy. To assess 
whether condition and time influenced accuracy, I constructed a model comparison analysis 
comparing 4 Linear Mixed Models (LMM) with accuracy as the DV; two models with each 
condition or time as fixed effects alone, a combined model with both factors, and a model with 
an interaction effect. All controlled for Subject ID as a random effect. 
To determine whether the behaviors influenced by condition were also influencing 
DMTS task performance, I ran a series of LMMs with accuracy as the DV, each behavior as a 
fixed effect, and Subject ID as a random effect. The behaviors that significantly predicted 
accuracy were then further analyzed with another series of LMMs, comparing three models for 
each behavior’s effects on accuracy (DV); a model that included just the behavior, one with both 
the behavior and condition as fixed effects, and one model with an interaction effect (all with 
Subject ID as a random effect). 
Finally, to determine the overall best model for predicting cognitive performance, a 
model comparison was conducted comparing models including each of the fixed effects 
(condition, time and the behaviors that significantly influenced performance) with and without 
each other, as well as models with any significant interactions. 
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 Behavior 
The best-fit model for predicting trial number included both condition and time as fixed 
effects. Model comparisons revealed that a model including both factors better-explained trial 
number than models with either factor alone or a null model, but there was no interaction effect 
between condition and time (Table 1). On average, subjects performed 32.8 (± 0.70) trials in the 
positive condition, significantly less than the number of trials performed in the negative 
condition (34.1 ± 0.73 trials; b = -0.05, z = -3.38, p = .002) or in the control (34.5 ± 0.69 trials; β 
= -0.07, z = -4.72, p < .001; Figure 3). Regardless of condition, subjects completed the most 
trials during the first 10 minutes of sessions (36.9 ± 0.54), significantly fewer during the middle 
third of the session (34.2 ± 0.72 trials; β = -0.08, z = -5.33, p < .001), and the fewest number of 
trials during the last 10 minutes (31.3 ± 0.80 trials; β = -0.09, z = -5.98, p < .001).  
 
Table 1. Comparison of the models used to predict Trial Number 
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Figure 3. The effects of Condition and Time on the number of trials subjects completed. Error bars 
reflect 1 ± SE. 
 
I found that of the 11 behaviors analyzed, 7 significantly differed between conditions (see 
Figure 4; Scratching; χ2(2)= 12.63, p = .002, Self-licking; χ2(2)= 15.17, p < .001, Threatening; 
χ2(2)= 18.98, p < .001, Self-touching; χ2(2)= 12.90, p = .002, Playing with pellet; χ2(2)= 23.83, p 
< .001, Cage-directed behavior; χ2(2)= 82.62, p < .001, Stereotypic behavior; χ2(2)= 161.95, p < 
.001).  
Specifically, I found that compared to the control condition, in both the positive and 
negative conditions there was significantly more stereotypic behavior (Figure 4a; negative: β = 
0.26, z = 8.66, p < .001; positive: β = 0.36, z = 12.37, p < .001), and self-touching (Figure 4e.; 
negative: β = 0.26, z = 3.50, p = .001; positive: β = 0.18, z = 2.49, p = .034), and significantly 
less cage-directed behaviors (Figure 4c.; negative: β = -0.19, z = -6.51, p < .001; positive: β = -
0.26, z = -8.65, p < .001) and playing with the pellet (Figure 4d.; negative: β = -0.14, z = -3.32, p 
< .001; positive: β = -0.20, z = -4.73, p < .001).  
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Compared to the negative condition, in both the positive and control conditions there was 
significantly less scratching (Figure 4b.; positive: β = -0.08, z = -3.04, p = .007; control: β = -
0.09, z = -3.10, p = .005) and threatening behavior (Figure 4f.; positive: β = -0.51, z = -2.55, p = 
.028; control: β = -0.97, z = -4.14, p < .001). There was also more stereotypic behavior in the 
positive condition than the negative (Figure 4a.; β = 0.10, z = 3.69, p < .001), and less in the 
control (β = -0.26, z = -8.66, p < .001) 
The only behavior significantly different in just the positive condition was self-licking 
behavior (Figure 4g.), of which there was significantly more in the positive condition than either 
the negative condition (β = 0.17, z = 3.28, p = .003) or the control (β = 0.18, z = 3.42, p = .002).  
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Figure 4. Results for the average occurrences of stereotypic behavior (a), scratching (b), cage-directed 
behavior (c), playing with the pellet (d), self-touching (e), threatening (f) and self-licking (g) between 
conditions. Error bars reflect ± 1 SE. ‘*’ p < .05, ‘**’ p < .01, ‘***’ p <.001. Note: Graphs depict mean 
aggregated summary results and do not control for subject differences, while the p values come from 
GLMM’s that control for Subject ID as a random effect. Note: Y-axis change between graphs a-d (ymax 
= 50) and e-g (ymax = 10). 
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3.2 Cognitive Performance 
Overall, subjects performed quite well on the DMTS task, with a composite average of 
83.4% (± 0.40) correct. This was as expected, since the criterion to participate in the study was 
80% or greater accuracy. There was a significant effect of condition on DMTS task performance 
(χ2(2)= 12.43, p = .002), with higher performance in the positive condition (84.1 ± 0.64%,  β = 
0.02, t = 2.96, p = .003) and control (84.5 ±  0.67%, β = 0.03, t = 3.09, p = .004) compared to the 
negative condition (81.5 ± 0.75%). There was no significant difference in performance between 
the positive condition and the control, and there was no significant effect of time on accuracy or 
an interaction between time and condition (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. The effects of Condition and Time on subject Accuracy (as measured by the proportion of 
correct trials to the total number of trials completed). Error bars reflect ± 1 SE.  
 
Of the seven behaviors significantly affected by the experimental manipulation, three also 
significantly affected performance on the DMTS task. Higher rates of playing with the pellet (β 
= .001, t = 3.66, p = .003, see Figure 6b) and self-licking behavior (β = 0.002, t = 3.84, p < .001, 
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see Figure 6c) related to higher levels of accuracy on the task. Contrasting this, increased rates of 
scratching correlated with decreased performance on the DMTS task (β = -0.001, t = -2.60, p = 
.010, see Figure 6a). Increased rates of stereotypic behavior also related to decreased 
performance, however the effect was not statistically significant (p = .055).  
 
Figure 6. The effects of scratching (a), playing with pellets (b) and self-licking (c) on Accuracy (as 
measured by the proportion of correct trials to the total number of trials completed) 
 
 Since both behavior and condition significantly affected cognitive performance, model 
comparisons were run to determine whether condition and the behavior were independently 
impacting performance, or whether there was an interaction. While each model predicting 
accuracy with behavior alone as a factor was significantly better than a null model, and every 
model was improved by the addition of condition as a fixed effect, none of the models showed a 
significant interaction (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Comparison of the models predicting Accuracy on the DMTS task 
 
 
The overall best-fit model for predicting accuracy on the DMTS task included scratching, 
self-licking, playing with the pellet, and condition as fixed effects, with Subject ID as a random 
effect. Adding time to the model did not improve the fit. In this final model, performance was 
significantly higher in both the positive and the control conditions compared to the negative 
condition, increased rates of playing with the pellet and self-licking behavior related to better 
 38 
performance, and increased scratching was related to a decrease in performance. Estimates (β) 
and p-values for all of the fixed effects in the final model can be found in Table 3. Overall, the 
final model reveals that while condition alone significantly predicts accuracy better than the null 
model, adding behaviors into the model as predictive factors provides a significantly better 
model for predicting accuracy than condition alone. Therefore, behavior can help explain 
variance in accuracy beyond what just the conditions explain.  
 
Table 3. Fixed effects values for the full model predicting Accuracy on the DMTS (including scratching, 
self-licking, play with pellet behavior, and condition with subject ID and session as random effects) 
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4 DISCUSSION 
Experiences immediately prior to cognitive testing affected both the subsequent 
performance on the cognitive test and the behavior of the capuchin monkeys. In line with 
predictions, a negative, frustrating experience impaired working memory performance compared 
to a previous positive experience or a control. This is consistent with previous studies in humans 
and primates that find impairments to working memory after stress (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 
1998; Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et al., 2008). Increases in dopamine release as the result of the 
experience of positive affect is theorized to enhance working memory (Ashby et al., 1999), 
however contrary to my predictions, a positive experience prior to the working memory test did 
not have an augmenting effect on task performance.  
While it is possible that positive affect may not have a facilitative effect on primate 
working memory in the task, it is also possible that the manipulation did not generate a sufficient 
increase in positive affect. For example, despite the fact that all subjects were ultimately 
successful with the task, some subjects never learned the most effective way to lift the lever 
(lifting straight up allowed for a very smooth and easy movement), and instead fought with the 
lever, trying to pull it towards them. This made the task somewhat more difficult. Additionally, 
and perhaps more importantly, several of the subjects responded quite aggressively to the 
removal of the apparatus. Anecdotally, these subjects would vocalize and threaten the 
experimenter as the tube was being unclipped from their cage, and they would often grab on to 
the apparatus and tightly hold it to prevent removal, to the point of nearly (and occasionally 
actually) breaking it. This may have mitigated any possible positive effects of the apparatus. 
Finally, my control may not have been appropriate. In the control, subjects were placed on a 
relatively easy task (the DMTS) after receiving a food reward for a behavior and protocol they 
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are extremely familiar with (entering their individual testing box). I therefore may be seeing 
some level of positive affect in the animals even during the control. Thus, the lack of a 
facilitative effect of positive affect on working memory above and beyond the control should be 
interpreted cautiously, and future work should focus on developing procedures that ensure the 
generation of positive affect.  
In line with my predictions, after the negative experience, subjects displayed increased 
rates of scratching and threatening behavior compared to both the positive condition and the 
control, as well as increased levels of stereotypic behavior, although this was only significantly 
greater than the control. Increases in these types of behaviors are strongly indicative of negative 
affective states (Lutz, 2014; Maestripieri et al., 1992; Troisi, 2002), signifying the effectiveness 
of the study’s negative manipulation in inducing a negative affect in the subjects.  
As there were no a priori predictions for what behaviors might increase when 
experiencing positive affect, I recorded all behaviors to see what I could find. The only behavior 
that occurred at significantly different rates in the positive condition than both the negative 
condition and control was self-licking behavior, which occurred at the highest rate after the 
positive experience. I do not have any explanations for why this may have been the case. While 
this behavior may be something important to look into in future research, the fact that I could not 
independently verify that I induced positive affect suggests caution. In fact, for all of the other 
behaviors for which I see a significant difference between the positive condition and the control, 
the difference for the positive condition is in the same direction as that of changes in behavior in 
the negative condition. Since I can more confidently conclude that the negative experience did 
result in negative affect, these findings imply that the positive condition created an affective state 
more akin to the negative condition than the control.  
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This conclusion is not, however, consistent with the results of scratching behavior, 
arguably the most reliable indicator of negative affect, or threatening behavior, both of which 
were significantly higher in the negative condition than either the positive or the control 
condition (which did not significantly differ from one another). Thus, an alternate possibility for 
the pattern of similar increases and decreases in some behaviors between the positive and 
negative conditions compared to the control is that some of these behaviors are more linked to 
arousal than affective valence. Both the positive and negative experiences involved interactions 
with a manipulated puzzle task, while the control did not. This may have caused arousal levels in 
both of these conditions that surpassed that of the control, and resulted in increased self-touching 
and stereotypic behavior and reduced cage-directed behaviors and playing with the pellet. This is 
further supported by the fact that cognitive performance was only affected by the negative 
condition (and not the control or positive) indicating this impact may be the result of negative 
affect and not an increase in arousal generally.  
Finally, in the control, the subjects received no additional food prior to testing, as in the 
other conditions. Therefore, another possible explanation for this pattern of behavior is that 
subjects were less satiated in the control, changing their behavior. On the other hand, there is no 
reason to predict that satiation would have directly affected any of the observed behaviors. In 
fact, the one behavior that there is theoretical grounds to expect would differ based on satiation 
levels was trial number, because less satiated subjects may be more motivated to get food 
rewards and therefore do more trials, but there was not a significant difference in the number of 
trials done in the control versus the negative condition.  
Ultimately I was unable to find a behavior reliably indicative of positive affect, in part 
because the experimental manipulation did not appear to effectively generate positive affect. 
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Although some of these behaviors (i.e., cage-directed behavior, self-licking and playing with 
food) may be related, this can only be demonstrated with further testing. I was, nevertheless, able 
to further validate the use of scratching behavior as an indicator of negative affect. The 
correlation between scratching and the negative condition compared to both of the other 
conditions, in conjunction with the significant finding that beyond condition, scratching itself can 
be predictive of decreased working memory performance, indicates that scratching may be the 
most reliable behavioral indicator of negative affect.  
It is important to note that my final, best-fit, model for predicting accuracy on the task 
included both condition and behavior as predictive factors. In other words, including the 
behaviors as factors significantly improved predictions of accuracy beyond what condition alone 
predicted. The most likely explanation for this is that despite my best attempts, the subjects’ 
affect was not entirely within my control. The subjects of the study live in complex social 
groups, and were subject to outside influences both before and during testing. It is possible that 
what behavior was measuring was the additional influence from non-testing factors on affect. 
This is a hypothesis that deserves further testing, but in the meantime, it is important to 
remember such outside influences when designing studies on affect.  
One final comment regards the relation of these studies to previous neuroscience work. 
Although I did not measure brain activation, our knowledge of which areas are activated for 
these tasks allows us to speculate. Unfortunately, these data do nothing to break the impasse 
between the two competing hypotheses of whether activation prepares organisms for subsequent 
responding and improves performance, or depletes necessary resources and impairs it. Research 
on prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation during different types of working memory tasks shows a 
lateralization of brain activation, with object working memory tasks (as used in the current 
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study) demonstrating relatively high left PFC activation (Courtney et al., 1998; Smith et al., 
1995). Similarly, as discussed in the Introduction, neurological studies have clearly demonstrated 
asymmetric effects of positive and negative emotions on brain activation, with negative affect 
activating the right hemisphere and positive affect activating the left (Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; 
Davidson et al., 1990).  
Interestingly, following the assumptions of this research, the current study found a 
damaging effect of negative affect (right hemisphere activating) on a task relying predominately 
on the left PFC. These results are clearly in contrast to the resource depletion hypothesis, which 
predicts that we would only see deficits in tasks reliant upon the activated area (right PFC). Due 
to the fact that I was unable to verify the experience of positive affect, further interpretation of 
the results is challenging. Indeed, it is not clear whether there was no positive affect, or whether 
both the positive experience and the control generated positive affect in the subjects, in which 
case the finding of an increase in performance in the positive and control conditions compared to 
the negative condition may be interpreted as supporting the facilitating activation hypothesis. 
There is also another possible explanation for the current results. As I did not take any 
measures of brain activation in the current study, and am only assuming left PFC dominance in 
the DMTS task because research has shown that object working memory is left lateralized. These 
studies, however, utilized non-meaningful shapes as visual stimuli, while the current study used 
distinct pictures. Some research has shown that working memory for images under short delays 
may actually be right lateralized in the PFC (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1996). 
Courtney and colleagues (1998) argue that working memory involving short-term, icon-like 
maintenance of an image relies more on the right prefrontal cortex, while learning rules for non-
meaningful shape memory may be more akin to verbal working memory, previously 
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demonstrated to be left lateralized (d’Esposito et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 1990), and thus 
explains the results of the other studies. This has since received additional empirical support 
(Wager & Smith, 2003), and would then imply that the current task relied predominately on right 
PFC activation, and results are consistent with the resource depletion hypothesis. This would 
also be congruent with my finding that negative experiences seemingly reduced working 
memory performance from the positive experience and a control baseline. Future research on 
how frustration such as experienced in this experiment may differentially, or not, impact object 
and spatial working memory is needed.  
In summary, the current study found a significant decrease in cognitive performance on a 
working memory task following a mild, negative experience. Previous studies have demonstrated 
deleterious effects of acute and chronic stress on working memory (Cazakoff et al., 2010; Mika 
et al., 2012), and some have even shown impairments after “mild” stress (Arnsten & Goldman-
Rakic, 1998), although I would argue that their stressor, a continuous loud noise for 30 minute 
prior to testing, is slightly more than mildly stressful. To my knowledge, however, this is the first 
study to look at the cognitive effects of a mild, negative experience that induces negative affect 
through a relatively natural behavior of the species. These results further inform the literature on 
the effects of mild stressors on cognition, as well as have implications for animal welfare and 
animal research (i.e. the order of the presentation of tasks/tests of varying difficulty levels, and 
therefore possibly frustrating, may affect subsequent performance). 
To improve future studies, researchers are badly in need of alternative measures of affect. 
One possibility is judgment bias tasks used in conjunction with the experimental manipulations 
of the current study, which may help to indicate whether positive affect was actually generated 
above and beyond the control, and I simply did not see working memory effects, or whether 
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modifications of the experience are needed (as is suspected) to actually generate positive affect. 
Further, multiple measures of affect would help improve the confidence of behavioral indicators 
of positive affect, once correlations between behaviors and positive affect are found. 
Additionally, in future work it will be important to control for non-test related activities that 
generate affect on their own (i.e., the frustration engendered by removing the apparatus or the 
positive affect engendered by the reward upon coming into the test area). This would help to 
better pinpoint which actions are changing affect, and thereby better predict the subject’s affect. 
Future work should also look at the effects of positive and negative affect on a variety of 
cognitive tasks as well as the effects of positive and negative experiences on subsequent social 
behavior.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A. Behavioral ethogram for all recorded behaviors 
Behavior Description 
Joystick Toucha,b Subject meaningfully touches the joystick with a hand or foot 
(does not count if subject leans against joystick or accidental 
touches it) 
Water Drink Subject consumes water from their water spout or bottle 
Scratch Rapid, repeated touching of the body with either a foot or hand. If 
a different part of the body is scratched it’s counted as a new 
occurrence, or if the same body part is scratched but with a 
different limb 
Shake Subjects full body vibrates, typically starts in the tail and runs up 
the body 
Auto-groom Subject touches, picks at or combs through their fur with one or 
both hands. Characterized by a pinching behavior, often 
accompanied with pushing their fur around and biting the area 
Self-touch Brief contact from the subjects hand or foot to another part of 
their body that is not better categorized by scratch or auto-groom 
Pacea,b Subject travels back and forth the full length of their test box. The 
same pace/tempo must be maintained in both directions, with no 
pause or hesitation at either end 
Manipulate object Subject holds or moves an object around, such as a tray or 
carabineer attached to the cage or a food item remaining 
Head twirla,b Subject’s head rapidly jerks back and arcs around. All 
occurrences of behavior counted, does not require 3-second 
interval, and an exception to the rule for interrupting a behavior 
Urine wash Subject’s hand is urinated on while being held between their legs, 
followed by a rubbing/scratching behavior elsewhere on the body 
Lick caging Subject licks or pushes teeth or mouth against caging or faceplate 
Bounce Subject crouches over onto all fours and jumps with all four limbs 
off of the caging 
Threaten Subject bares teeth and assumes a rigid posture; or slams both 
hands into front/back of box quickly and aggressively 
Wipe caging Subject uses entire hand and palm and rubs it across a section of 
the caging or faceplate 
Pick at caging Subject pokes, scratches or touches the caging or faceplate with a 
finger or fingers 
Lip-smack Subject rapidly chatters their teeth or touches their lips together, 
often accompanied by grunts or squeaks and a headshake 
Push on faceplate Subject uses both hands to move the front or back faceplate. 
Hands are either both flat against the faceplate, or one is pushing 
against the faceplate with the other in the pellet dispenser hole to 
move the faceplate right or left 
Play with pellet Subject removes pellet from their mouth. This behavior may 
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include simply spitting out the pellet and then eating it again, 
removing the pellet and tapping it against some part of the cage 
or themselves, or rubbing it back and forth between their hands 
Lick self Subject uses their tongue to contact or pushes their mouth against 
another part of their body 
Rub hands Subject places palms together and rapidly moves hands back and 
forth 
Reach Subject extends hand or arm out past caging (must have limb 
extended to wrist or further) 
Play with water Subject touches or hits the water source, causing water to run but 
does not drink 
Note: Every occurrence of behavior was recorded. Behavior was counted as a new occurrence instead of a 
continuation of the last if there was a 3-second period between the end of the first occurrence and the start 
of the second. If another behavior occurred between two occurrences of a different behavior (regardless of 
time) the interrupted behavior is counted again.  
a Every occurrence of this behavior is counted regardless of the amount of time between occurrences 
b Occurrences of this behavior do not interrupt the 3-second count on another behavior being a new 
occurrence or not 
 
